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Deleuze’s Transformation of the 
Ideology–Critique Project: 
Noology Critique
Benoît Dillet
[A concept] has nothing to do with ideology. A concept is full 
of critical and political force of liberty. It is precisely its power 
as a system that brings out what is good or bad, what is or 
is not new, what is or is not alive in a group of concepts.
 — Gilles Deleuze1
Introduction: Ideology… what ideology?
Fifty years after the publication of Reading Capital by Louis Al-
thusser and his students, the political landscape is unrecogniz-
able. We are immersed in economic parlance, from politicians, 
experts, and intellectuals: everyone claims to know best how to 
control the deficit, how to regulate the banking systems, how to 
stop the flows of tax evasion, etc. Although the press has per-
haps been too quick at pointing out the resurgence of Karl Marx 
and Marxist thought in the wake of the economic crisis, we are 
nonetheless witnessing a certain turn to political economy in 
continental philosophy. It is as if critical theory had forgotten 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 195), 32.
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about the economic order and on waking up to a totally dis-
organized and deeply unequal world, it suddenly found itself 
being accused by some of being compromised by the capitalist 
machinery, and by others as being speculative or naive. But this 
situation is hardly new; the end of the 1970s — with the rise of 
a discourse against the “totalitarian left” and preparations for 
the neoliberal shock therapies — also saw a resurgence of the 
problems of economic reason and ideology. When we charge 
critical theory of being compromised by putting forward crea-
tivity or acceleration as the ideology of neoliberal capitalism, we 
denounce (or regret) that ideology was not taken into account. 
Pierre Macherey notes that Michel Foucault’s conscious distanc-
ing from Marxist parlance meant that “the concept [of ideol-
ogy] did not have to be taken into account”2 since it had lost 
its substance, its facility to diagnose 1970s’ political economy. 
Instead, Foucault deliberately wanted to create new concepts to 
overcome the Marxist regime of discourse. Not simply to reject 
the predominance of capital over labor, but to supplement the 
analysis with a more refined understanding of political real-
ity (discipline, governmentality, and biopolitics). Furthermore, 
Foucault aimed to move away from the ideology/science dialec-
tic, dominant in the French left in the 1960s–1970s.3 I argue that 
the discussion of ideology is not only implicitly present in the 
work of Foucault and that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
2 Pierre Macherey, Le sujet des normes (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2014), 
216.
3 In the section entitled “Knowledge [savoir] and ideology” in Archaeology 
of Knowledge, Foucault attempted to overcome explicitly this opposition. 
“It can be said that political economy has a role in capitalist society, that 
it serves the interests of the bourgeois class, that it was made by and for 
that class” or “ideology is not exclusive of scientificity” (Michel Foucault, 
Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. Alan M. Sheridan Smith [London: Rout-
ledge, 2002], 204, 205). Étienne Balibar comments on Marx’s difficulty in 
seeing the “Bourgeois political economy” as ideology given its scientificity 
(and the absence of abstraction or inverted reality), but Marx overcame 
this difficulty by writing “a critique of political economy.” See Étienne 
Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London/New York: 
Verso Books, 2007), 54–6.
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but a central aspect of their work. In order to do so I reconstruct 
their position vis-à-vis ideology to understand more broadly 
their engagement with political economy and the critique of the 
images of capitalism.
By contrasting too starkly between the subjective (ideology) 
and the objective (science), the irrational and the rational, polit-
ical economy fails to take into account the production of desire 
in capitalism. This is problematic, since the abstraction of de-
sire — taking place alongside the abstraction of labor — should 
not be taken for granted but rather be put at the center of a re-
newed ideology critique. By integrating desire with the infra-
structure, “[l]ibidinal economy is no less objective than political 
economy,” write Deleuze and Guattari.4 To establish a libidinal 
economy is another way of doing a critique of political economy 
and demonstrating the noological production of science, with-
out falling into the extreme opposite position that places desire 
as the irrational force to be celebrated: 
[t]here is an unconscious libidinal investment of desire that 
does not necessarily coincide with the preconscious invest-
ments of interest, and that explains how the latter can be per-
turbed and perverted in “the darkest organization,’ below all 
ideology.5 
The darkest organization here is what I want to revisit as “nool-
ogy,” and I will define this project as the re-materialization of 
ideology critique.
My interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s work here fol-
lows and complements Macherey’s recent studies on ideology 
that attempt to think ideology today (by reading Foucault), that 
is, when after Daniel Bell and others, the end of ideology was 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 345.
5 Ibid., translation modified.
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proclaimed.6 Macherey’s position is particularly interesting 
since he does not want to discard this disappearance of ideology 
and instead makes a parallel between the discourse on the end 
of ideology and Foucault’s work on the society of norms. Ideol-
ogy has become both ubiquitous and imperceptible, and critics 
have either given up in front of ideology since it is most adapta-
ble, invisible, and indiscernible, or worse they have also believed 
that ideology had vanished, as if contemporary societies were 
post-capitalist and post-materialist. Macherey’s rhetorical ques-
tion is: “is only a society without ideology possible?”7 In ask-
ing this question and arguing for the persistence of the theme 
of ideology, he does not claim that society should be or can be 
without ideology, but that the problem is not posed correctly. It 
should be posed in terms of normalization and discipline rather 
than ideology and repression.
As Alberto Toscano has recently argued (following Guil-
laume Sibertin-Blanc), the new concepts introduced by Foucault 
often supplement the Marxist critique of political economy: it 
is capital that conditions biopolitics, and therefore requires “a 
revision in the very notion of ‘ideology.’”8 Deleuze and Guattari 
understood this move very early on and integrated it into their 
work. They argue that alienation and subjection should not be 
understood in terms of ideology and ideological structures, but 
by drawing the diagrams of the technologies of power and the 
emergence of the normalizing power. For instance, in 1973, they 
explain:
Ideology has no importance here: what matters is not ideol-
ogy, and not even the “economic/ideological” distinction or 
6 Pierre Macherey, Études de philosophie “française”: De Sieyes à Barni 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2013), 63–110; Macherey, Le sujet des 
normes, 213–352.
7 Macherey, Études, 96.
8 Alberto Toscano, “What Is Capitalist Power? Reflections on ‘Truth and 
Juridical Forms,’” in Foucault and the History of Our Present, eds. Sophie 
Fuggle, Yari Lanci, and Martina Tazzioli, 26–42 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 33.
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opposition; what matters is the organization of power. Be-
cause the organization of power, i.e., the way in which desire 
is already in the economic, the way libido invests the eco-
nomic, haunts the economic and fosters the political forms 
of repression.9
For them, ideology as understood and commonly used by Marx-
ists in the 1960s and 1970s prevented an understanding of the 
organization of power, the becoming-state of all organizations, 
and particularly that of the French Communist Party (PCF) that 
aspired to duplicate and replicate the Soviet Communist Party 
apparatus by using its scientific propositions. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the Marxist use of infrastructure (the material condi-
tion) and superstructure (culture, ideas, desire, and ideology) 
prevents the integration of desire and affects into a critique of 
political economy, when diagnosing the material constitution 
of humans, particularly in relation to employment and work. 
They briefly introduced the concept of “noology” at the end of 
A Thousand Plateaus, in the 12th and 14th plateaus, almost as 
an afterthought, to leave the book as an open book and an open 
system: “Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely 
the study of images of thought, and their historicity.”10
A noological model is concerned not with thought contents 
(ideology) but with the form, manner or mode, and function 
of thought, according to the mental space it draws and from 
the point of view of a general theory of thought, a thinking 
of thought.11
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 
1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 263, emphasis in the original.
10 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 376.
11 Ibid., 499–500.
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It is not what one thinks or what a class thinks that matters, 
but how they think it, in what assemblages thought takes place, 
and for what purpose. For the moment, it is enough to remark 
that they intend to collapse the two-level analysis of ideology 
critique, and rather analyze the wiring of thought. I will un-
pack these two quotations along two lines: first by showing that 
Deleuze and Guattari did not radically discard ideology-critique 
but transformed it by adding new problems (particularly that of 
affects and desire), and second, by pointing to the potentials of 
a noology critique, when we understand noology as a re-mate-
rialized understanding of ideology.12 Although I am taking these 
two quotations from A Thousand Plateaus as the starting point 
of my argument, I will mostly focus on Anti-Oedipus and the 
critique of familialism in this essay to show their engagement in 
ideology critique.
To introduce the context of noology critique as their trans-
formation of ideology critique, we need to note that for Deleuze 
and Guattari, it is on the one hand a continuation of the project 
of the reversal of Platonism started by Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition, but on the other hand to resist an anti-Platonism 
that is equally idealist — placing thought above everything else, 
before the body, a thought without the body but also a body 
without thoughts, or a body without organs. The increasing 
forms of mental alienation today, linked to a cognitive and affec-
tive capitalism, have only furthered the division of mental and 
physical labor rather than abolished it. Everyone is a proletar-
ian, and by using the expression “proletarian ideology,” Marx-
12 This is also what Fredric Jameson perceived in his chapter on Deleuze: the 
noology critique project is to expose the ideology of dualism (and Jameson 
finds the contemporary resurgence of ethics as a specialized discipline as 
paradigmatic). See Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London/
New York: Verso Books, 2009), 181–200. Another contribution worth sign-
aling is Jason Read’s brilliant article on noology that focuses on commod-
ity fetishism and abstract labor. Read is in dialogue with Marx’s later work 
(when the thematic of commodity fetishism replaces that of ideology). See 
Jason Read, “The Fetish is Always Actual, Revolution is Always Virtual: 
From Noology to Noopolitics,” Deleuze Studies 3, supplement (2009): 
78–101.
131
noology critique
ists have largely displaced the meaning and the role of ideology. 
Marx and Friedrich Engels never used this expression since the 
very concept of ideology always already refers to the dominant 
“worldview.”13 I simplify a much longer story here, but this “vac-
illation” of the concept of ideology led many Marxists to adopt 
largely idealist views.14 To take one example out of many, we can 
refer to the Marxist cinema historian, Georges Sadoul, as com-
mented on by André Bazin. Bazin notes that in writing about 
the origins of cinema, Sadoul had forgotten about the technical 
invention of cinema and argued for “a reversal of the historical 
order of causality, which goes from the economic infrastructure 
to the ideological superstructure,”15 as if “cinema is an idealis-
tic phenomenon. The concept men had of it existed so to speak 
fully armed in their minds, as if in some platonic heaven […].”16 
The idealist use of ideology consists here in thinking that ideas 
invented cinema and that scientists and technicians had almost 
no role to play, that cinema was not born in the experiments 
with technical objects. The idealist conception of ideology re-
duced ideology-critique to a battle of ideas, forgetting the affec-
tive and the material formation of ideology itself.
13 Étienne Balibar makes this important point that historically the “prole-
tarian worldview” is “inseparable from the goal of constructing a party,” 
that is an institution with a formal structure, and not simply some vague 
ideas of class consciousness (that is also absent from Marx). Yet can any 
party exist without a general theory of thought? (Étienne Balibar, Masses, 
Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, 
trans. James Swenson [London: Routledge, 1994], 153).
14 “The current uses of the term ideology, Marxist and non-Marxist […] 
tend to fall back to one side or other of a classic demarcation line between 
the theoretical […] and the practical” (Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of 
Marx, trans. Chris Turner [London/New York: Verso Books, 2007], 45).
15 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2005), 17.
16 Ibid.
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Ideology is dead, long live noology!
I want to propose the hypothesis that the notion of noology is 
useful to understand the transformation, rather than the denial, 
of ideology during the 1970s and 1980s in the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari. A crucial aspect of this transformation is their in-
sistence that “desire is part of the infrastructure.”17 The signifi-
cance of this statement and what it implies can be summed up 
in two points. First, Deleuze and Guattari attempted in Anti-
Oedipus to supplement the critique of political economy with a 
critique of libidinal economy, yet they are cautious to note that 
these should not be confounded and merged, but that their dif-
ferentiating investments should be integrated into the analysis. 
I argue, largely following Macherey, that by integrating desire 
into the infrastructure, they intend to flatten or collapse the in-
frastructure/superstructure in order to re-materialize ideology 
critique (as noology critique). The second point is that Deleuze 
and Guattari want to save desire from ideology, and show that 
in fact there is an economy of desire, or that desire is part of the 
economy. They explicitly refer to Pierre Klossowski’s The Liv-
ing Currency (1970) on this point, to make evident the associa-
tion of desire with ideology (“two kinds of fantasy”), for desire, 
drives and affects “creat[e] within the economic forms their own 
repression, as well as the means for breaking this repression.”18
17 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 104. This is again emphasized in an 
interview, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “On Anti-Oedipus,” in 
Deleuze, Negotiations, 19. Frédéric Lordon has recently developed this 
problem forcefully in Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx of Desire, 
trans. Gabriel Ash (London/New York: Verso Books, 2014). For Lordon, 
the desires of the workers are captured by the “master-desire” of the 
employers. Even though Lordon makes clear that the bosses (patrons) are 
not only employers, and so the worker-employer opposition found in this 
book for the most part differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of the production of desire.
18 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 63. See also, Pierre Klossowski, The 
Living Currency, trans. Daniel W. Smith, Vernon W. Cisney, and Nicolae 
Morar (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2016).
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Readers of A Thousand Plateaus will certainly remember the 
bold and provocative statement “there is no ideology and never 
has been.”19 Yet, far from denying ideology itself this statement 
was intended to be performative and dramatic, much like a slo-
gan, as Robert Porter has astutely described it.20 As we will see 
further, for Deleuze and Guattari, once ideology is transformed 
into “noology,” the power relations and the technical wiring of 
thought become evident and the evasive understanding of ide-
ology as “ideology-cloud”21 disappears. This transformation is 
made possible by integrating Foucault’s work, as a point of no 
return, but also by continuing the critique of images of thought 
that occupied a central place in Deleuze’s early work from Ni-
etzsche and Philosophy to Difference and Repetition, and later in 
Cinema 2: Time-Image and What Is Philosophy?. In the English 
preface to Difference and Repetition written in 1986, Deleuze 
adds that the project of the image of thought (noology) remains 
for him “the most necessary and the most concrete.”22 In What 
Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari conclude that the image 
of thought is the plane of immanence, it is the image of “what 
it means to think” and the image of “the uses of thought” in a 
particular society at a given moment: “[t]he image of thought 
retains only what thought can claim by right.”23 Every society 
produces an image of thought, and the new image of thought 
never fully replaces the old image, but superposes the old one 
19 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 4.
20 Robert Porter, “From Clichés to Slogans: Towards a Deleuze-Guattarian 
Critique of Ideology,” Social Semiotics, 20, no. 3 (2010): 233–45, at 239.
21 I am using Michel Pêcheux’s expression “ideology-cloud” (idéologie-nuage) 
as discussed by Macherey, see Le Sujet des normes, 290–98. The other 
notion that Pêcheux introduced in his general theory of ideology in 1968 
was “ideology-cement” (idéologie-ciment), which implies the proximity 
and materiality of ideology as opposed to the floating weightlessness of the 
“ideology-cloud.”
22 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), xvii. Again in 1988, in an interview with 
François Ewald for Le magazine littéraire, Deleuze explains that noology 
should be the program of philosophy. See Deleuze, Negotiations, 148–49.
23 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Graham Burchell (London/New York: Verso Books, 1994), 37.
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as a new layer or stratum. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
noological time as “a stratigraphic time”:
A stratum or layer of the plane of immanence will necessar-
ily be above or below in relation to another, and images of 
thought cannot arise in any order whatever because they in-
volve changes of orientation that can be directly located only 
on the earlier image […].24
Noologies do not arrive in sequence, the old one replacing the 
new one, rather, they accumulate over time; they are part of a 
process of sedimentation. Noology is the project of both diag-
nosing the current and the older strata (the images below), and 
constructing new layers of sedimentation. The production of 
new images of thought is particularly difficult and painful since 
it requires a certain violence to overcome the shared indiffer-
ence attached to the activity of thinking.25
The new category of noology is necessary in their endeavor 
to leave behind the equivocation and the ambivalence attached 
to the notion of “ideology.” I argue that it was not simply to re-
but the Marxist tradition that both Foucault and Deleuze-Guat-
tari adopted new terminologies: the organization of power or 
the “art of government” for Foucault, and noology for Deleuze 
and Guattari. This practice of using new terms (noology) to 
contribute to the re-elaboration of a classic concept (ideology) 
is not unique in Deleuze and Guattari. We can compare this to 
their treatment of the notion of “utopia,” suggesting that it can 
be replaced by Samuel Butler’s “Erewhon,” a term that refers si-
multaneously to “No-where” and “Now-here.”26 Concepts are 
perishable and can be mutilated, they need to be re-activated 
24 Ibid., 58.
25 I have attempted to explain this aspect of Deleuze’s thought in Benoît Dil-
let, “What is Called Thinking? When Deleuze Walks Along Heideggerian 
Paths,” Deleuze Studies 7, no. 2 (2013): 250–74.
26 “[I]n view of the mutilated meaning public opinion has given to it, perhaps 
utopia is not the best word” (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 
100).
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or remodeled to fit the new state of affairs. Just as Deleuze re-
ferred to Charles Péguy’s expression that events can rot or de-
compose when losing their dynamism, concepts too can rot.27 
Every concept derives from a necessity but these are historically 
determined, and there is a historicity of concepts.
We can admit indeed, given the conditions of formation, 
that “ideology” is not a very good concept […] [but] are 
there concepts that can be considered “good all the way” and 
that did not need to be safeguarded against recuperations 
[dérive]?28 
This effort of updating ideology-theory by Macherey should be 
welcome and pursued, hence my modest contribution to this 
debate here.
Familialism
When one is looking for ideology in Anti-Oedipus, “familialism” 
first comes to mind. Familialism could be defined as both the 
reduction by psychoanalysts of the forms of mental and social 
disorder to the Oedipal complex, as well as the strict naturaliza-
tion of the family-structure that conditions this interpretative 
framework. Polemically, Deleuze and Guattari write about the 
Oedipal complex: “In reality it is a completely ideological begin-
ning, for the sake of ideology.”29 For them, the Oedipal complex 
is not false, since such a position would be equally problem-
atic and ideological, but participates in ideology (“for the sake 
of ideology”), and ultimately, in capital. The whole project of 
Anti-Oedipus was therefore “the denunciation of Oedipus as the 
“inevitable illusion” falsifying all historical production.”30 Their 
critique of ideology could not be clearer here. Yet we should not 
27 Deleuze, Negotiations, 170.
28 Macherey, Études, 87.
29 Ibid., 101.
30 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames 
Hodges and Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 309.
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rush to the thought that the Oedipal schema is a falsifying pro-
duction because it is repressing the individual, or because indi-
viduals desire it. This is the mistake that certain authors made 
by attempting to argue for a Freud-Marx synthesis. Reich and 
others were too quick at identifying “social repression [répres-
sion] and psychic repression [refoulement] at the cost of a series 
of illusions and led to hypostasize ‘sexual liberation’ as the ob-
ject of the struggles of emancipation.”31 Contrary to these forms 
of Freudo-Marxism, Deleuze and Guattari treat familialism as 
an image of thought, and in doing so they will therefore argue 
that Oedipus does exist and, even more surprisingly, they will 
claim that the material existence of Oedipus is universal:
Yes, Oedipus is universal. But the error lies in having believed 
in the following alternative: either Oedipus is the product of 
the social repression-psychic repression system, in which 
case it is not universal; or it is universal, and a position of de-
sire. In reality, it is universal because it is the displacement of 
the limit that haunts all societies, the displaced represented 
[le représenté déplacé] that disfigures what all societies dread 
absolutely as their most profound negative: namely, the de-
coded flows of desire.32
In this remarkable passage, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that 
the error of Oedipus will not disappear so easily given its mate-
rial existence in society, particularly in relations with “universal 
history.” But what is “universal history” and what is its relation 
to noology? Universal history should be understood as the con-
tingent integration in all societies of two limits: the absolute 
limit of schizophrenia as the dazzling and anarchical creative 
production of the unconscious, and the relative limit of capital 
that is integrated within the social to produce its immanent dy-
31 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, Deleuze et l’Anti-Œdipe: La production du désir 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), 82.
32 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 177.
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namism.33 Capitalism is ultimately hypocritical since it portrays 
itself as a moderate mechanism of distribution of wealth (via the 
notorious trickle down effect for instance) while functioning on 
the constant displacement of its limits: “things work well only 
providing they break down, crises [are] ‘the means immanent to 
the capitalist mode of production.’”34
The overall objective of Anti-Oedipus is to show the corre-
spondence and the analogy at work between familialism and 
capital. Capitalism can only constantly displace its limits by re-
integrating new roles for “daddy-mommy-me.”35 In other words, 
the Oedipal noology is found not only at the level of psychoana-
lytic practice but, more crucially, at the level of the socius: it is 
the historical production of reality that is abstracted. Therefore, 
to study familialism noologically means to study its social insti-
tutions and its social (re)production, both in terms of content 
(related to bodies) and expressions (related to signs). Deleuze 
and Guattari want to “revamp the theory of ideology by saying 
that expressions and statements intervene directly in productiv-
ity, in the form of a production of meaning or sign-value.”36 Put 
differently, the only theory of ideology that they would agree 
with is one that studies the intervention of expressions and 
functions in the mode of libidinal and economic production. 
Such a general theory of ideology (as noology) would account 
for the images that create an adhesion to the capitalist system.
By taking a closer look at Anti-Oedipus, one finds this re-
vamped theory of ideology beginning with what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the axiomatic. They refer to the capitalist axiomatic 
as the organization of rules (axioms) that underlie the capitalist 
33 This thesis about the internal limit of capitalism that is constantly dis-
placed is interpreted from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx’s Capital 
book III. They write: “If capitalism is the exterior limit of all societies, this 
is because capitalism for its part has no exterior limit, but only an interior 
limit that is capital itself and that it does not encounter, but reproduces by 
always displacing it” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 230–31).
34 Ibid., 230.
35 Ibid., 51.
36 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 89.
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machinery, but this axiomatic is far from being static. On the 
contrary, it is extremely plastic and adaptable to new situations 
and forms of contestation: “How much flexibility there is in the 
axiomatic of capitalism, always ready to widen its own limits 
so as to add a new axiom to a previously saturated system!”37 
Deleuze and Guattari use the term axiomatic rather than ideol-
ogy since it explains the operability of capitalism and the per-
formativity of the capitalist axioms. The axiomatic constantly 
metamorphoses, or to be more precise, it is composed of layers 
of sedimentation, in which a new layer always covers a previous 
one. There is a constant movement forward, and the new axiom 
that supplements and modifies slightly the orientation of the 
capitalist axiomatic attempts to overshadow the previous axiom: 
“memory has become a bad thing.”38 The capitalist axiomatic has 
also emptied out the meaning of language and transformed it 
into a domain of “order-words”:
Above all, there is no longer any need of belief, and the capi-
talist is merely striking a pose when he bemoans the fact that 
nowadays no one believes in anything any more. Language 
no longer signifies something that must be believed, it indi-
cates rather what is going to be done.39
Language is turned into a functional realm in which there is no 
room for enlarging sympathies. The axiomatic noologically in-
tends to replace the social by the space and time of capital but 
“one must not think that it replaces the socius” since the social 
machine and the technical machines are two different types of 
machines.40 In these extracts, Deleuze and Guattari conduct 
their ideology critique without falling prey to a cynicism that 
refuses to critique capitalism and its inner workings, but em-
phasize the disappearance of belief that underlies the capital-
37 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 238.
38 Ibid., 250.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 251.
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ist axiomatic. In short, while classical and orthodox Marxists 
argued that ideology distorted reality and led workers to forget 
about the material production of their lives, Deleuze and Guat-
tari on the other hand demonstrate that ideology in the 1970s 
was characterized by the privation of those distorted realities 
(beliefs); ideology had become ideology-cement instead of ide-
ology-cloud.41
Once all beliefs disappear, hope disappears, friendship and 
the family disappear, cynicism grows, and the social reproduc-
tion works through images that come to govern our existence. 
These images are the functions of thought that circulate in the 
socius:
We have repudiated and lost all our beliefs that proceeded by 
way of objective representations. The earth is dead, the desert 
is growing: the old father is dead, the territorial father, and 
the son too, the despot Oedipus. We are alone with our bad 
conscience and our boredom, our life where nothing hap-
pens; nothing left but images that revolve within the infinite 
subjective representation. We will muster all our strength so 
as to believe in these images, from the depths of a structure 
that governs our relationships with them […].42
This new economy of images appears in the ruins caused by 
cynicism and in the extreme faith in objectivity. Yet this ob-
jectivity is not sufficiently denounced, as Deleuze and Guattari 
note, for not being objective, but, on the contrary, for passing 
for objectivity. They critique the idea of general equivalence on 
which capitalism rests by demonstrating that “capitalists and 
their economists” assert that “surplus value cannot be deter-
mined mathematically.”43 The same capitalists do everything “in 
favor of the very thing they are bent on hiding: that it is not the 
41 “The unidimensional society has taken away ideology’s capacity to create 
illusions” (Macherey, Le sujet des normes, 324).
42 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 308.
43 Ibid., 228.
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same money that goes into the pocket of the wage earner and 
is entered on the balance sheet of a commercial enterprise.”44 
In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari present a concrete noo-
logical study, they uncover the institutionality and materiality 
of thought (the notorious “confidence of the market”). The in-
stitutional organization of the distribution of money that is sup-
posedly rational and mathematic is in fact largely based on a 
dissimulation operated by the financial system: “one is correct 
in speaking of a profound dissimulation of the dualism of these 
two forms of money, payment and financing — the two aspects 
of banking practice.”45 In their noology critique, Deleuze and 
Guattari therefore find the hidden formula of the two forms of 
money that are mediated by the bank: ideology is located in the 
financial institutional system itself.46 The paradox of money is 
that, on the one hand, we take money as being the most objec-
tive fact in our lives, but on the other, we know that it operates 
through “contingent rules” that are abstracted from our lives.47
To take an example, we can refer to the current “mediamac-
ro” in place in the United Kingdom that equates government 
budgets with household budgets (“keeping the books”) so that 
the ideological message of austerity “one should not spend more 
than one has” gets largely integrated into the doxa: everyone (in-
dividuals and firms) have to tighten their belts.48 To equate indi-
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 229, emphasis in the original.
46 Read comments on Deleuze’s distinction between an arithmetical and 
a differential understanding of surplus-value introduced in one of his 
Vincennes courses in December 1971: the first one is quantifiable while the 
second one refuses equivalence. The differential understanding emphasizes 
the construction of the equivalence between a unit of money and a unit of 
knowledge: “there is an encounter between a flow of money and a flow of 
knowledge” (Read, “Fetish is Always Actual,” 91).
47 Martijn Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism: What Progressives 
Have Missed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3.
48 I borrow the term “mediamacro” from Simon Wren-Lewis, to refer to the 
vulgarized discourse on macroeconomics largely present in the UK media. 
See Simon Wren-Lewis, “The Austerity Con,” London Review of Books 37, 
no. 4, February 19, 2015, 9–11.
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vidual household budgets and government budgets is extremely 
misleading and clearly participates in a political project.49
Yet, this apparent objectivity of capital, Deleuze and Guat-
tari note, is “by no means a failure to recognize or an illusion 
of consciousness,” but rather the productive essence of financial 
capitalism itself.50 It is precisely because the desire for money 
is a desire for one’s own powerlessness that the dissimulation 
is productive and not deceptive or distracting.51 The difference 
between the absolute limit that schizophrenia represents (all 
structures break down in schizophrenia; it is a dissolution of the 
subject and productive work) and the relative limit of capitalism 
lies in the process of re-integrating the decoded flows of desire 
in an axiomatic.52 As I explained earlier, the construction of this 
axiomatic is a constant process of adding new axioms, much 
like sedimentation: one function (axiom) does not fully replace 
the former function but only adds a new dimension to conjure 
and to push back the moment of the ultimate breakdown (the 
absolute limit). This is why “the bourgeois is justified in saying, 
not in terms of ideology, but in the very organization of his axi-
omatic: there is only one machine,” and not two classes with op-
posing interests.53 The notorious slogan of neoliberalism “there 
is no alternative” is not a mere ideological statement but an or-
ganization of the axiomatic, since the axiomatic is defined by its 
singularity that gathers all axioms and binds individuals into a 
single social machine. The “bourgeois” works at the noological 
level of functions and the axiomatic, that is in a post-ideological 
49 This can be compared to Paul Krugman’s oft-cited argument that business 
and economics should be differentiated. See Paul Krugman, “A Country Is 
Not a Company,” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1996, 40–51.
50 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 239.
51 “[T]he flow of merchant capital’s economic force and the flow that is deri-
sively named ‘purchasing power’ — a flow made truly impotent [impuis-
santé] that represents the absolute impotence [impuissance] of the wage 
earner as well as the relative dependence of the industrial capitalist” (ibid., 
238–39).
52 On this important distinction, see Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 
245–47.
53 Ibid., 254.
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world making up the social machine. Once again Deleuze and 
Guattari want to contrast an analysis that takes into account 
noology, functions, and the axiomatic on the one hand, with 
the ill-suited dogmatic Marxist framework that focuses on class 
consciousness, false consciousness, thought-contents, beliefs, 
and the “superstructure” on the other. It is precisely because 
beliefs and ideology have vanished that the Marxist ideology 
theory (although Deleuze and Guattari portray a rather crude 
version of it) is no longer relevant.
Images of capital and images of images
Having discussed how Deleuze and Guattari transformed the 
project of ideology critique into a project that takes into account 
desire, not as an immaterial and weightless substance but in its 
materiality, we can now go as far as to conclude that they aimed 
to study the material inscriptions of ideology: transforming ide-
ology critique into geology or physics.54 At this point, we need 
to come back to the loss of belief and the reign of images to 
understand how Deleuze provides an answer to questions about 
the capitalist exploitation of abstract desire in Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image.
There are at least two reasons why the turn to images is cru-
cial here. First, instead of representation it is the materiality of 
images that interests Deleuze, the circulation of these images, 
continuing in a way Benjamin’s early reflections on the repro-
ducibility of images. Second, the analyses of images continue 
the noology project, of studying the historicity of the images of 
thought.
Social reproduction is established with image-functions, 
and just as philosophy has conceptual personae, capitalism has 
“figures.” Through the production of these figures and roles es-
54 “But in reality, the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body 
without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself ” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 283).
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tablished within the axiomatic, individuals become functions 
integrated in the axiomatic:
[Individuals] are nothing more or less than configurations or 
images produced by the points-signs, the breaks-flows, the 
pure “figures” of capitalism: the capitalist as personified capi-
tal — i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital; and 
the worker as personified labor capacity — i.e., a function de-
rived from the flow of labor.55
Deleuze and Guattari conclude that, through the mechanism of 
social reproduction in place in familialism, private persons are 
secondary, they are “images of images,” images of the second 
order.56 The familialist images operate by copying the images of 
capital. This is why they call these private images, “images of im-
ages” or “simulacra.”57 In capitalism the images of the first order 
are generated to capture the flows of desire by capital. Desires 
are captured and abstracted to fit in one of the images produced 
by capitalism: “[C]apitalism fills its field of immanence with im-
ages: even destitution, despair, revolt — and on the other side, 
the violence and the oppression of capital — become images of 
destitutions, despair, revolt, violence, or oppression.”58 It is also 
because of the withering of belief that the old understanding of 
ideology as belief system does not work anymore for neoliberal 
societies (after the 1970s). Beliefs have been “flattened” by the 
axiomatic, to use a word that is recurrent in this third chapter of 
Anti-Oedipus. An entire “psychology of the priest” is organized 
by the images of capital that are reproduced by their simulacra 
in the family structure (the father as the capitalist, and so on).59 
But contrary to what we may think at first, there is no contra-
55 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 264.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 “Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of 
capital (“Mister Capital, Madame Earth,” and their child the Worker), with 
the result that these images are no longer recognized at all in the desire 
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diction between the withering of belief and the extreme mor-
alization of society.60 Bad conscience is socially organized and 
reinforced by the images and the melodrama. In the economy of 
images, the bad passions are strictly dominating:
[D]epression and guilt [are] used as a means of contagion, 
the kiss of the Vampire: aren’t you ashamed to be happy? fol-
low my example, I won’t let you go before you say, “It’s my 
fault.” O ignoble contagion of the depressives, neurosis as the 
only illness consisting in making others ill […] the abject de-
sire to be loved, the whimpering at not being loved enough, 
at not being “understood” […].61
In the vacuity of belief and the reign of images, the role of 
schizoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus and of cinema in Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image, would be to produce images against the images of 
capital. The struggle against the economy of sad passions cannot 
be launched at the level of positive messages and content, but 
rather at the material level, in the physics of thought, to change 
the image of thought (what it means to think): “[I]mages are 
not in our head, in our brain. The brain is just one image among 
others.”62 It is an image of thought to conceive the brain as a 
recipient of images, while in fact the organization of the brain is 
co-constituted with the exteriorizations. The image of the brain 
shapes how thought processes take place, what limitations one 
puts on one’s thought. Deleuze would argue that the powers 
that be have an interest in keeping a socially accepted image of 
the brain as a calculating machine that fits the homo economi-
cus. Noology critique operates from inventing new human and 
non-human assemblages instead of clinging to old structures 
of thought. There is no contradiction between the micro and 
that is determined to invest only their simulacrum. The familial determi-
nations become the application of the social axiomatic” (ibid.)
60 On this paradox, see Mark Alizart, Pop théologie: protestantisme et postmo-
dernité (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 2015).
61 Ibid., 268–69.
62 Deleuze, Negotiations, 42, translation modified.
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macro levels, instead the flattened understanding of ideology 
takes into account the relations between all levels. “It is not that 
our thinking starts from what we know about the brain but that 
any new thought traces uncharted channels directly through its 
matter, twisting, folding and fissuring it.”63 Thinking is a micro-
physical operation in the brain, rather than an immaterial prod-
uct. But this microphysics does not mean that noology forgets 
about the hierarchization and verticalization at work in socie-
ties — familialism and hyle morphism are examples of such rela-
tions of domination. 
What is fundamental in noology critique is that it does not 
and cannot work without inventing new forms of thought. The 
production of new images in cinema is an example of such a 
production for Deleuze to “restore our belief in this world.”64 
Deleuze distinguishes here between a cerebral cinema and a cin-
ema of control.65 While the latter produces clichés and melodra-
mas, the former creates new types of images (through lectosigns 
and noosigns) in the chain of images. What interests Deleuze in 
cinema is how certain images attempt to break from clichés (or 
the “images of images”) that private individuals are subjected 
to in the capitalist axiomatic. Since we are embedded in the 
dark world of images of images (simulacra), we can only rework 
these types of images by standing behind the camera, from the 
depth of the cave, instead of succumbing to these:
On the one hand, the image constantly sinks to the state of 
cliché […] [and] it is a civilization of the cliché where all the 
powers have an interest in hiding images from us […]. On 
the other hand, at the same time, the image constantly at-
tempts to break through the cliché, to get out of the cliché.66 
63 Ibid., 149.
64 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 172.
65 This is particularly well contrasted in his letter to Serge Daney (Deleuze, 
Negotiations, 68–79).
66 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 21.
The project of creating “images” — and therefore brains (“give 
me a brain”67) — in cinema allows for the possibility of breaking 
with the civilization of clichés in order to believe in this world 
again.
67 Ibid., 196.
